North East Journal of Legal Studies
Volume 1 Spring 1993

Article 7

Spring 1993

Making Sense of Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3
Susan Lorde Martin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/nealsb

Recommended Citation
Martin, Susan Lorde (1993) "Making Sense of Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3," North East Journal of Legal
Studies: Vol. 1 , Article 7.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/nealsb/vol1/iss1/7
This item has been accepted for inclusion in DigitalCommons@Fairfield by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It is brought to you by DigitalCommons@Fairfield with permission from the rightsholder(s) and is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this item in any way that is
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses, you need to obtain
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license
in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@fairfield.edu.

102

103

105.

Minn. Stat. Ann. Sec. 181.941(1) and (2)

(West 1988).

106.

Minn. stat. Ann. Sec. 181. 940(2) and (3)

(West 1988).

107.

Minn. Stat. Ann. sec. 181.941 (1)

108.

Minn. stat. Ann. Sec. 181.942 and 181.944 (West 1988).

109.

Minn. Stat. Ann. sec. 181.941 (1)

(West 1988) .

110.

Minn. Stat. Ann. Sec. 181.941(2)

(West 1988).

111.

Minn. Stat. Ann. Sec. 181.941(4)

(West 1988) .

112.

Mont. Code Ann. Sec. 49-2-310(4) and 311 (1987).

113.

N.H. Code Admin. R.

114.

Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 50-1-501 to 50-1-505 (1988).

115.

Vt. stat. Ann. tit. 21 Sec. 472 (a) and 474(b)

(West 1988).

(Hum.) 402.03(a)

by
Susan Lorde Martin*
I.

(1988).

(1989).

116. Schafer v. Board of Public Education, 903 F.2d 243
(3d cir. 1990).
117.

Cal. Gov. Code Sec. 230.8(a)

118.

conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. Sec. 31-51gg (West 1989).

119.

or. Rev. Stat. Sec. 659.360(10) (d)

120.

Nev. Rev. Stat. Sec. 392.490 (1989).

121.

Nev. Rev. Stat. Sec. 613.335 (1989).

(West 1991).

(1991).

122. The Parental Leave Crisis: Toward a National Policy
(Edward F. Z1gler and Meryl Fran eds., New Haven, Yale
University Press 1988).
123. Jennifer G. Gimler, "Mandated Parental.Leave and the
small Business: A cause for Alarm?" (Symp?s1um Issue: Small
Business) 93 Dickinson Law Review 603 (Spr1ng 1989).
124.

MAKING SENSE OF RULES IOb-5 AND 14e-3

Id. at 623.

125. Arlene A. Johnson, "Parental Leave--Is It the Business
of Business?" 13 Human Resource Planning, No. 2., 119 (1990).

Introduction

Npw that the
eighties are gone and Michael
Mil ken and Ivan Boesky and other high profile securities
traders have served tlme in jail, the relative calm in Wall
Street "wheeling and dealing" presents a wonderful
for Congress to finally clarify insider trading law.
Al thougp the newspapers have been full of insider trading
stories and numbers of highly publifized insider trading
cases have come before the courts,
Congress has never
clarified what insider trading is and what specific behavior
should be prohibited.
Leaving these "details" to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the courts has
resulted in wrangling between the former and the latter and in
a body of law that does not make much sense.
·This article will first discuss the Congressional purpose
and methods for prohibiting insider trading. Then, SEC Rules
lOb-5 and 14e-3 will be explained and compared.
The
comparison will show that the statutes authorizing the SEC to
promulgate those rules are not identical and, therefore, the
letter of the law does not require those rules to be
interpreted identically.
Nevertheless, there is no policy
reason to have rules prohibiting insider trading vary
depending on whether or not the securities being traded are
the subject of a tender offer.
Therefore, this article
concludes that Congress, in order to create coherent insider
trading law, should explicitly indicate which of the two rules
has been properly interpreted by the courts. Application of
the rules is difficult enough without having the additional
burden of incongruous policy.
II.

Prohibiting Insider Trading

Congress has made clear its intention to stop insider
trading as well as other market practices it considers abusive
in order to maintain
confidence in the fairness of the
securities
markets.
The
stock
market
crash
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of October 1,9, 1987. magnified
importance of encouraging
public conf1dence 1n the secur1 ty markets. 1
That event,
together witj the dramatic increase in insider trading cases
in the 1980's and a public perception that inside traders are
not caught, 9
Congress intent on doing battle against
insider trading.
PecHliarly,
although
legislating
against
insider
trading,
Congress has purposefu1fY declined to. define
statutorily what insider trading is.
The House Comm1ttee on
Energy and Commerce has defined insider trading as "trading in
the securities markets while in possession of • material'
information (generally, information that would be important to
an investor in making a decision to buy .or Jfll a sec':'ri ty)
that is not available to the general publ1c.
The rat1onale
for refusing to enact into law this or any other definition is
to avoid restricting the reach of securities laws and to avoid
facilhtating schemes designed to circumvent the intent of the
laws.
Using general antifraud provisions rather than a
specific definition has, as noted approvingly by the House
Committee, permitted courts to construe the
broadly anft the SEC to use
its
rulemaking author1ty
creatively.
Moreover, according to the House Committee,
court decisions and SEC actions h1fe sufficiently clarified
principles of insider trading law.
Unfortunately, since that House Committee report in 1984,
the law has become more confusing rather than more lucid.
This is particularly so because a recent opinion of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreting
Rule 14e-3 11 is at odds with the United States Supreme Court's
interpretations of Rule lOb-5 • 18
III.

Rule lOb-5

Section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 19
provides, in pertinent part, that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations
as
the
Commission
may
prescribe
as
necessary or appropriate in
public interest or for
the protection of investors.
Pursuflnt to that section the SEC promulgated Rule
lOb-5 which provides, in pertinent part, that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ...
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, ...
(c) to engage in any act, practice or course of
business which operates ... as a fraud or deceit upon

any person, ifl connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
Although
nowhere
specifically
prohibiting
insider
trading, these general antifraud provisions have been the
primary bases for lawsuits against those who have bought or
sold securities while in
of material, nonpublic
information about those securities. 3 Because Congress has
declined to be specific about the prohibitions on insider
trading, it has been left to the SEC and courts to determine
what fraud means in this context.
The SEC determined in re Cady, Roberts & Co. 24 that the
common law imposes on corporate officers, directors, other
insiders, and "tippees" who are privy to the same information
';'s
insi?ers,
a
duty to
disclose
material,
nonpubli.c
1nformat1on before trading in their company's
The United States Supreme Court has also looked to the common
law .definition of fraud and
used it in interpreting
Sect1ofi lO(b) and Rule lOb-5.
In Chiarella v. United
States
the Court held that one who trades in securities
using material, nonpublic information is committing fraud and
violating Rule lOb-5, only if he or she has a duty to
the information and such a
dutY. arises only from a
relationship of trust and confidence. 28 Thus, traders have no
obligation to reveal material facts to those with whom they
they are neither
insiders nor
f1duc1ar1es.
Accord1ng to the Court, silence cannot be
fraudulent absent a duty to di,flose and duties arise only
from some special relationship.
Chiarella, who was employed by a financial printer, was
able
deduce from documents he handled at work, the names of
companies that were the targets of corporate takeovers.3l
his knowledge, Chiarella bought the target
firms stock
sold at a profit after the takeover bids
were made publ1c.
The Court reversed his conviction of
violating Section
lO(b)
and Rule
lOb-5
holding
that
Chiarella's use of the nonpublic information was not fraud
because 3pe did not have a duty to disclose it before
trading.
The Court declined to rule on a theory, that had
not been presented to the jury, that Chiarella violated the
securities laws because he breachnd a duty that his employer
had to the acquiring corporation.
Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, asserted the theory
those, like Chiarella, who misappropriate material,
information
affirmative duty to disclose the
1nformat1on before trad1ng.
Such a theory, he opined, would
not limit legitimate professional securities activities, but
would prohibit Jhe use of information inaccessible to others
by legal means.
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, also asserted
that
"persons
having
access
to
confidential
material
information that is not legally available to others generally
that
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are prohibited by Rule 10b-5 from engaging in schemes to
exploit their structural informational advantage through
trading in affected securities. To hold otherwise ... is to
tolerate ft
wide
range of manipulative
and
deceitful
behavior."
In Dirks v. SEc 38 the Supreme Court reiterated that "mere
possession of nonpublic information does not give rise to a
duty to disclose or abstain; only a specific relationship does
that." 39 The Court also repeated its rejection of a parity of
information rule which would require that traders refrain from
trading if they are in possession of information unavailable
to others.' 0 The Court held that a tippee, one who receives
information from an insider, has a duty to disclose
from trading that derives from the duty of the 1ns1der ·
Thus, a tippee's duty not to trade on material, nonpublic
information arises from an insider's duty to shareholders and
attaches only when the t4\ppee knows or should know of the
insider's breach of duty.
What is clear from Chiarella and Dirks is that Rule 10b-5
liability requires the breach of a duty by one who trades on
material, nonpublic information; mere possession of material,
nonpublic information by one who trades on that information in
the securities markets is not enough for liability.
The
misappropriation theory of liability outlined by former Chief
Justice Burger adheres to this general formula but does not
require that
breach be of a duty owed to buyers or sellers
of securities.
The br!ach may be of a d'ffY owed to an
employer, 4 to a patient 4 or to a relative,
for example.
Rule 10b-5 liability, according to this theory, attaches when
people engage in securities transactions using material,
nonpublic information they have misappropriated from any owner
of that information in violation of a fiduciary duty or other
relationship of trust and confidence.
The misappropriation
theory has
adopted by the Second, Third, Seventh and
Ninth Circuits. 7 It has not beyn definitively approved by
4
the United States Supreme Court.
In 1991 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seconfi
Circuit, sitting in bane, decided United States v. Chestman,
a case that illustrates the difficulties courts have in making
sense of insider trading law as it currently exists.
The
occurrences that gave rise to the lawsuit began in November,
1986 when Ira Waldbaum, the president and controlling
shareholder of Waldbaum, Inc., a publicly traded company,
negotiated the sale of the companYs to the Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Company, Inc. (A&.P). 0
Mr. Waldbaum told his
sister, Shirley Waldbaum Witkin, that he would tender her
shares of Waldbaum stock as part of the sale so that she could
avoid the
fiomplications of tendering after the public
announcement.
warned her not to discuss the impending
sale with anyone.
On November 24 Mrs. Witkin gave her stock
certificates to her brother. Later that day, Mrs. Witkin told

her daughter, Susan Loeb, in response to questions about her
whereabouts that morning, that she had gone out to turn over
her Waldbaum stock, to her brother. Mrs. Witkin also told her
daughter that it was important that she not tell anyone except
her husband because it could jeopardize the sale.
Mrs. Loen
told her husband, Keith, and warned him not to tell anyone.
On November 26 Keith Loeb called Robert Chestman, a
stockbroker and financial advisor for Gruntal &. Co., a
brokerage house. 55 Loeb had been doing business with Chestman
since 1982 and sfhestman knew that Loeb's wife was Ira
Waldbaum's niece.
According to Loeb's testimony, some time
between 9 and 10:30 in the morning he told Chestman that he
"'had some definite, some accurate information' that Waldbaum
was being sold at a 'substfptially higher' price than the
market value of the stock."
Between 9:49 a.m. and 12:35
p.m. that day Chestman purchased 11,000 shares of Waldbaum
stock (including 3000 for himself, 1000 for Loeb, and 7000 for
his other discretionary aliounts) at prices ranging from
$24.65 to $26.00 per 51hare.
Chestman denied having spoken
to Loeb that morning.
At the close of trading on November
26 the tender offer was announced afid on November 27 the price
of Waldbaum shares rose to $49.00.
During
an
SEC
investigation
into
the
Waldbaum
transactions, Loeb agreed to cooperate with the government,
paid a fVfe, and disgorged the profits from his 1000 share
purchase.
Chestman denied any wrongdoing, claiming hiif!
November 26th Waldbaum purchases were based on his research.
Chestman was tried and convicted of, inter alia, ten counts of
fraudulent trading in connection with a tender offer in
of Rule 14e-3 frd ten counts of securities fraud in
v1olat1on of Rule 10b-5.
He was barred from the securities
industry and turned over to the
$235,125 in gains
from the Waldbaum transactions. 4
He voluntarily began
serving a two-year sentence in Allenwood Federal Prison Camp
in June 1988 and was released in May 1989 after his conviction
was reversed by fs three-judge panel of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals.
After the SEC and federal prosecutors complained that the
Chestman decision would hamper their efforts to prosecute
other insider trading cases, the Second circuit agreed to the
unusual measure of a full court review.
The court heard
in bane on
9, 1990 and handed down its
op1n1on on October 7, 1991.
The full court vacated the
panel's decision on, inter alia, the Rule 14e-3 and Rule 10b-5
questions and then affirmed the convictions for fraudulent
trading in connection
a tender offer, but reversed the
Rule 10b-5 convictions.
Judge Meskill, writing for the
court,
joined by four other judges and a
fifth
concurred.
Five judges concurred in the Rule 14e-3
from the reversals of the Rule 10b-5
conv1ct1ons.
One Judge concurred with the Rule 10b-5
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reversals but dissented from the Rule 14e-3 affirmances.

71

Chestman's Rule 10b-5 convictions had been based on (1)
his purchase of Waldbaum stock for Keith Loeb "aiding and
abetting Loeb's misappropriation of nonpublic information in
breach of a duty Loeb owed to the Waldbaum family and to his
wife Susan;" and, ( 2) his purchase of Waldbaum stock for
himself and other clients
from his being a tippee of
the misappropriated informat1on.
Based on the past Rule 10b5 jurisprudence of Chiarella, Dirks and the misappropriation
theory, the full court concluded that Chestman could not be
convicted of violating the Rule unless Keith Loeb had breached
a duty owed to his wife and/or her family because of a
fiduciary-like relationship of trust and confidence, and
Chestman knew of Loeb's breach. 73 The court then concluded
that kinship alone does not create the required relationship
and that there was no evidence offered that Loeb had a
fiduciary-like relationship with his wife or her family nor
that he had expressly agreed to keep
thfi
information about the impending sale of the fam1ly bus1ness.
Without Loeb's having breached a duty by disclosing the
information about Waldbaum's to
Chestman could not
be liable for violating Rule 10b-5.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuf6 t affirmed Chestman' s
convictions for violating Rule 14e-3.
The court was able to
so affirm while reversing the Rule 10b-5 convictions because
of the different language of the two Rules and their
authorizing statutes, as supported by other evidence of
Congressional intent.
IV.

Rule 14e-3

Section 14(e) of the
A.ct of
which was enacted as part
1n 1968
and
amended to its current vers1on 1n 1970,
prov1des that
[ i] t shall be unlawful for any person to make any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in
connection with any tender offer or request or
invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of
security holders in opposition to or in favor of
any such offer, request, or invitation. The
Commission shall, for the purposes of this
subsection, by rules and regulations define, and
prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent,
such acts and practices as
fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.
Section lO(b) and Section 14(e) are similar.

The former

p:ohibits the use of manipulation or
in connection
w1th the purchase or sale of securities.
The latter
p:ohibi ts manipulatifin or
or fr.au.d in connection
w1th a tender offer.
Both sect1ons spec1f1cally authorize
the SEC to
rules designed to prevent the prohibited
activities.
Faced with the difficulty of prosecuting insider trading
cases after the Chiarella decision because of the duty
requirement, the SEC promptly
Rule 14e-3 pursuant
to Section 14 (e) in October 1980.
Many of the highly
publicized insider trading cases involved buying shares of
publicly traded companies just before tender offers for those
shares were made public and then selling the sharfis at a
substantial profit after the offer was announced.
If
Section 10(b) required the SEC to prove that such traders were
breaching a duty in using the nonpublic information for
personal gain or that they obtained their information from
others who were breaching a duty for personal advantage, then
the SEC would use Section 14 (e) instead to prosecute such
insider trading cases.
Contrary to the requirements the
Supreme Court
in Chiarella for a Section 10(b),
Rule 10b-5 prosecut1on, Rule 14e-3 says that in a situation
involving a tender offer, trading by persons in possession of
nonpublic .
which they know or should know
was acqu1red from 1ns1ders constitutes prohibited conduct.8ij
There is no specification that such trading is prohibited only
if the insider is breaching a
duty created by some
relationship of trust and confidence and the trader knows of
the breach.
In Che¥fman, the Second Circuit addressed the validity of
Rule 14e-3.
The court emphasized the deference given to an
administrative agency's regulation promulgated under an
express Congressional delegation unless the regulation is
"'arbitrarrs, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
'"
The court then consid;fed whether Congress
author1zed the SEC to enact Rule 14e-3.
After analyzing the
plain meaning of the words of Section 14(e), the legislative
history of the Section and
legislation,
it
concluded that Congress did so authorize.
Section 14(e) directs the SEC to "define ... such acts
and
as
are
fraudulent,
deceptive
or
manipulative."
Congress' specific use of the term
rather than "explain" or sigive examples of" or "enumerate"
"identify and regulate",
must mean that the SEC is being
authorized to determine what acts and practices are fraudulent
in the context of tender offer activity. In this connection,
where the concern is maintaining securities markets that are
fair, and appear to be fair, to the investing public, there is
no purpose for requiring a breach of a fiduciary duty to any
particular person or corporation as an element in a trading
violation. The Congressional purpose in prohibiting insider
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trading is to have the securities markets be fair so that the
investing public will havf3 confidence. in .their integrity and
keep investing in them.
Thus, 1t 1s reasonable that
Congress would have authorized the SEC to tinker with a
definition of fraudulent acts and practices to make it suit
the particular problem addressed by the Williams Act·
The
Second Circuit concluded that the wofids of the statute ,
particularly "define'', are dispositive.
At the very
that word makes it difficult to conclude that Rule 14e-3 1s
" b1"trarx
capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the
ar
statute."
In addition, Judge Meskill, writing for the court , noted
support for his interpretation of Secthon 14(e) in. the
legislative history of the 1970 amendment.
He also po1nted
to legislative activity since the promulgation of Rule 14e-3,
specif?,cally the Insider Trading. and Sanctions .A':t of 1984
(ITSA)
and the Insider Trad1ng and Secur1t1es Fraud
Enforcement Act ( ITSFEA), 98 as indicative of the Rule's
validity.
The legislative hist<;>ries
ITSA and
specifically mention Rule 14e-3 w1 th tac1 t approval.
In
fact
the House Energy and Commerce Committee noted its
that the SEC adopt a rule under ITSA similar to Rule
14e-3, 101
The whole tone of these legislative histories
evidences
Congress'
primary
interest
in
strengthening
enforcement
inside tz:aders . by giving
SEC broad
authority and flex1ble laws w1th wh1ch to work.
Nevertheless, critics have argued that Section 14(e)
cannot be significantly distinguished from Section lO(b) and,
therefore intenfretations of the latter also set precedent
0
for the
The argument asserts that when the United
States Supreme Court in Chiarella ruled that there can be no
Rule lOb-5 violation by trading on material, nonpublic
information absent a duty to
the Court was creating law
that also applies to Rule 14e-3.
V.

Reconciling Rule lOb-5 and Rule 14e-3

Because the language of Sections 10(b) and 14(e) are not
the same, it is not a stretch to conclude, as the Second
Circuit did, that Chiarella's interpretation of the former
does not necessarily set precedent for the latter.
Section
14(e) instructs ttbr SEC to "define . .. acts and practices as
are frauduhrnt,"
a much more "compelling legislative
delegation"
than exists in Section lO(b).
This strong,
clear language combined with Congress' subsequent extended
considerations of insider trading law and passage of ITSA and
ITSFEA make it hard to dispute Congress' intent to eliminate
insider trading and to allow
great deal of
flexibility in pursuing that obJect1ve.
That intent
supports the validity of Rule 14e-3.
Unfortunately,

acceptance

of

Rule

14e-3

as

a

valid

exercise of SEC authority, although making it easier for the
SEC to prosecute insider trading cases, creates an incoherent
body of insider trading law. If the Congressional purpose in
insider trading laws is to maintain the integrity of
markets so that outsiders will keep investing, then
there 1s no reason to have liability attach with greater
requirements under Rule lOb-5 than under Rule 14e-3 merely
because the latter regulates trades in the context of tender
offers . Outside investors may perceive themselves to be at an
unfair disadvantage, and decline to invest in the securities
markets, whenever they believe the markets are controlled by
others who have access to any material , nonpublic information
is
through particular diligence:
1nexpl1cable fortuity.
Holding investors
l1able for
only when they have breached a duty
or have used 1nformat1on obtained from someone else who
a duty will permit many trades which threaten the
1ntegr1 ty of the markets.
For example, if the information
Chestman received from Loeb was about a revolutionary new
or marketing concept Waldbaum's was about to reveal,
1nstead of about a pending tender offer, Rule 14e-3 would not
been applicable and Rule lOb-5 would not have been
v1olated under the Second Circuit's analysis of Loeb's absence
of a duty.
Nevertheless, outside investors would have been
similarly disadvantaged because of their lack of access to
Chestman obtained through his special relationship
w1th Ke1th Loeb. The inconsistencies in the· interpretations
of the two rules resulted in the Second Circuit's peculiar
in Chestman:
( 1) Chestman was guilty of being an
7ns1de
because he traded on material , nonpublic
1nformat1on concerning a pending tender offer that he knew or
should have known came from an insider and that is a violation
of Rule 14e-3; but, (2) Chestman was not guilty of fraud in
connection with the purchase and sale of his Waldbaum stock
because Keith Loeb, from whom Chestman obtained the material
nonpublic information on which he traded 1 did not breach
fiduciary-type duty to his wife in disclosi ng the information;
therefore, there was no Rule lOb-5
It is reasonable for both Rule lOb-5 and Rule 14e-3 in
view of the Congressional purpose of achieving fairness'and
the perception of fairness in the securities markets
to
.liability
f.or
trading
on
material,
nonpu'blic
1nformat1on .whenever 1t has been acquired in a way that is not
legally ava1lable to the general investing public. The idea
of unfair informational advantage serving as the basis for
insider tfu,ding . violations has been circulating for more than
a decade.
Th1s theory responds to the basic Congressional
purpose and to the psychology of investors.
It
the
need for creating. artificial theories of liability,
that do
the a1m of protecting investors, in order to catch
1ns1de traders who seem to elude standard interpretations of
fraud.
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The practical problem is, however, that a significant
body of law, relying on common (yaw defini tiona of fraud,
already exists for Rule 10b-5. 1
The Second Circuit's
solution in Chestman was to interpret Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3
differently relying on the differences in language in their
authorizing statutes, but eschewing a discussion of pol icy
reasons for the varying interpretations.
VI.

Conclusion

It is time for Congress to define fraud, or to expressly
empower the SEC to do so, in the context of all insider
trading securities transactions.
There is no policy reason
for Sections 10(b) and 14(e) and the rules promulgated under
them to be interpreted differently. There is no policy reason
for the rules of common law fraud to govern securities law
liability. There is no policy reason for insider trading to
be illegal only when a duty is breached. The actual threat to
public participation in security markets is the
that insiders and their friends have access to Information
that puts all others at a disadvantage when transacting
purchases or sales in the securities markets.
Therefore, liability under Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3 should
attach when the method of acquisition of the information is
wrongful.
Achieving an informational advantage should be
wrongful when it is the result of some special relationship
and, therefore, is not lawfully available to the investing
public. fn informational advantage achieved through mere good
fortune 11 or extra diligence or superior intelligence could
be traded on lawfully without prior disclosure.
Congress'
clear statement to this effect would help to achieve the goal
of fair securities markets and would clarify for investors
when disclosure before trading is required.
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CAN DEMAND NOTES REALLY
BE DEMANDED?

by
Peter M. Edelstein*
Introduction

Facts:

ABC Bank lends $100,000 to B. Benny.
B. Benny
and delivers to the bank a negotiable
note payable "on demand".
ABC later
demands payment.
B. Benny refuses.
ABC sues B.
Benny for $100,000. B. Benny defends on the grounds
that reasonable notice was required and not given.

Issue:

Whether a holder of a demand note can demand payment
at any time?

Decision:

Maybe •. . .

A "demand note" is an instrument payable on demand and
thos7 payable at sight or on presentation and those
no t7me for payment is stated. 1 By its nature, and
as reflected
long accepted case law and in the u c c
demand note entitles the holder to freely determine
tlm:
payment. In fa?t, such a note is actually due on the date
I_Rade,, and
has been suggested that its name is
no actual prior demand is necessary to
enforce payment.
.

Questions concerning a holder's ability to require
payment of f3
note at any time arise because of two
apparently
rules of law and because the intent
of the
not always clear. A two step analysis is
call7d. for:
(1) what is the effect of the applicable
of the Code? and, (2) what is the intent of th
e
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